Recently, Li and Lee proposed a new remote user authentication scheme using smart card. However, their scheme requires a verification table and the user's identity is not protected. Moreover, users cannot change their password off-line. In order to overcome the security flaws, we propose a new scheme which provides more security without affecting the merits of the original scheme.
Introduction
The use of new electronic services, such as egovernment, requires strong security. Among the security components used to protect the access to data stored in a server, the remote user authentication process is a key element. Remote user authentication schemes are used to verify and validate the legitimacy of each user by means of the knowledge of specific security parameters.
The first remote user authentication scheme for an open network was proposed in [10] . The scheme is based on one-way hash function, such as MD5 [20] or SHA-2 [19] . However, the scheme requires that the server stores a password list making it vulnerable to threats of revealing passwords in the directory [3] or modifying the verification table [8] .
In 1991, a remote user authentication scheme with smart cards and without verification table was proposed in [3] . Since 1991, several remote user authentication schemes using smart cards have been proposed [21, 22, 25, 26] to enhance security. Unfortunately, in those schemes, the user sends its identity over a common channel to the server making them susceptible to identitytheft attack [6] .
Later, Das, Saxena, and Gulati proposed the first dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme [6] . The concept of dynamic ID prevents that an attacker can know the user's identity. Since the proposal of Das et al., several dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemes [1, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 27] have been proposed with the attempt to reduce security vulnerabilities.
In 2011, Li and Lee proposed a robust remote user authentication scheme [13] and claimed that their scheme is more secure than those in previous work. However, we demonstrate that their scheme does not achieve all the security goals [12, 15] which a strong remote user authentication scheme should provide, such as protect the identity of each user during the login phase, also, it does not maintain a verification table and password change off-line.
In this paper, we aim to modify the scheme proposed by Li and Lee and propose a new scheme. The new scheme keeps the merits of Li-Lee's scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of Li-Lee's scheme. We show the security flaws of Li-Lee's scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our scheme. The security evaluation and comparison of the proposed scheme is described in Section 5. We conclude the paper with Section 6.
Review of Li-Lee's Scheme
In this section, we briefly review the scheme proposed in [13]. The notation used in this paper is summarized in Table 1 . 
Password Update Phase
In this phase, the user and the server perform the update password process as follows: Users choose password freely: in this case, the scheme proposed by Li and Lee achieves this goal. The user chooses her identity and password in the registration phase.
No password reveal: in this case, the goal is achieved. The user sends h(h(PW  RU1)) to the server instead of her password.
Mutual authentication: this goal is achieved because the server sends security parameters (C10 || RC1 || RS1) encrypted with the session key SK = h(C8 || C7) which can be computed only with the knowledge of X and N. On the other hand, the user needs to decrypt the message using the session key which can be computed only with the knowledge of C2 = h(PW  RU1).
Session key agreement: this goal is achieved because the server and the user compute the same session key for carrying out the mutual authentication process.
User anonymity: in this case, the scheme proposed by Li and Lee fails. The user sends her identity over a public network.
Efficiency for wrong password login: in this case, the scheme proposed by Li and Lee fails. The smart card does not verify the validity of PW before it initializes the creation of the login request message.
Proposed Scheme
This section describes the process for a new dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme. It is based on one-way hash function and symmetric cryptography. The scheme allows the user to establish a session key and get access to the server, but at the same the user does not reveal her ID.
The initial assumptions are 1) the bit length of the secret keys and nonce is 256, 2) the one-way function used is SHA-2, and 3) the one-way function is public.
Registration Phase
When the user wants to be part of the system, she chooses an ID and PW, and then hashes the ID and PW to create a message digest. Next, the user sends the message digest to the server over a secure channel. Upon receiving the message digest from the user, the server computes the security parameters (steps 2 to 4) using exclusive-or operation, string concatenation operation and one-way hash function. Then, the server stores the security parameters into the user's smart card and delivers the smart card to the user. The process is as follows:
Login Phase
Whenever a user wants to get access to the server, she inserts the smart card into the smart card reader and keys the correct ID and PW. Then, the smart card verifies the correctness of the ID and PW by means of steps 2, 3 and 4. If the verification is positive, the smart card computes the login request message. As a result, the user gets a unique login request message (RU1, C4, C5) which does not have its ID or PW in clear text. In step 9, the smart card sends the login request message to the server over an open channel. It is very important to note that it is very hard to link the ID of the user with the login request message. The process is as follows:
Verification Phase
Upon receiving the login request message, the server verifies the legitimacy of the user by means of steps 1 to 6. If the verification is positive, the server generates a nonce RU2 and uses it to compute new security parameters (steps 8 to 11) for the user. Then, the server generates a nonce RS1 and uses it to compute the secret parameter between the server and the smart card h(RSC1  RS1). In step 15, it sends the login response message. Upon receiving the login response message, the user's smart card decrypts the message using the session key. Then it computes and verifies the validity of the secret parameter h(RSC1  RS1). If the verification is positive, the smart card replaces the old value of C1, C2, C3, RU1 by a new one C1new, C2new, C3new, RU2 and the mutual authentication is done. 
S: C6 = ESK{

Password Change Phase
This phase is invoked whenever the user requires changing her PW for a new one PWnew. The user inserts her smart card into the smart card reader and then types her ID and PW. Then, the user's smart card computes the following operations:
. SC: REPLACE C1 by C1new
Security Evaluation and Comparison
In this section, we show that our proposed scheme resists very well-known attacks and achieves the security goals described in [12, 15] . Moreover, we carry out the formal verification of our protocol using the AVISPA tool to validate its security.
Security Analysis
We demonstrate that the proposed scheme is secure against very well-known attacks.
Off-line guessing attack: an adversary may attempt to extract the server secret keys (x, y) from C1, C2, C3. However, this attack will fail because it is computationally infeasible to invert the one-way hash function. Moreover, if the adversary is a legal user, she can recover
Masquerade user attack: if an adversary may attempt to masquerade as a valid user, she must be able to forge a valid login request message (RU1, C4, C5). However, she cannot compute a valid C4 = h(h(x || y || RU1) || h(x  y) || RU1)  h(ID || PW || RSC1) without the knowledge of ID, PW, x, and y. Moreover, the adversary should be capable to compute the session key
Masquerade server attack: if an adversary attempts to masquerade as a server, she must be able to forge a valid login response message C6 = ESK{ C1new, C2new, C3new, RU2, RS1, h(RSC1  RS1)}. However, the attacker does not know the correct values of x, y, and C3, which makes it very hard to compute the correct session key.
Stolen database attack: in this scheme, the server does not maintain a verification table which stores sensitive information related with each user.
Parallel session attack: if the adversary has captured previous communications between the victim and the server, the adversary may attempt to impersonate as a legal user. However, the value of RUi, C4 and C5 are different each time because the value of RUi is updated.
Leak of password attack: if the adversary obtains the victim's smart card, she cannot recover ID or PW from C1, C2 or C3 or any combination of them.
Security Goals
We demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves the security goals described in [12, 15] . Early detection of incorrect password: in this scheme, if an adversary obtains the victim's smart card and she tries to initialize the login phase, she will fail because she must be authenticated by the smart card before she initializes the login phase. In this case, the adversary needs to know the correct ID and PW.
Without verification table: in this scheme, the server does not maintain a verification table or database.
Users choose password freely: in this scheme, each user chooses her password freely without the participation of the server.
No password reveal: this security goal is achieved; the user shares h(ID || PW) with the server instead of her password in clear.
User anonymity: this security goal is achieved; the user does not send her ID in clear to the server over an open channel.
Mutual authentication: this goal is achieved because the smart card and the server verify the identity of each other.
Session key agreement: this goal is achieved because the smart card and the server compute the same session key to encrypt and decrypt sensitive information.
Formal Verification
We model our protocol using AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [2] tool. The specifications of the protocol are in HLPSL (High-Level Protocol Specification Language) [5] . An HLPSL is divided into roles played by any entity in the protocol, as well as the session and environment roles. Moreover, it is necessary to define the security goals that have to be done by the protocol.
In the validation process, we considered the smart card and server roles played by SC and S, respectively. The role smart card appears in Figure 1 .
The role environment is shown in Figure 2 . This role is used to find vulnerabilities in the protocol that an intruder (i) can use to break the security. In this case, the intruder is the network and it knows all the messages sent by role smart card and role server.
We verify the following security goals: (1) confidentiality of the nonce generated by the smart card and server, and the session key; and (2) authentication of the smart card and server. The security goals are shown in Figure 3 .
The verification was done using the back-end OFMC because it can be used to verify protocols which compute operations with or-exclusive. Moreover, the back-end OFMC can detect the following attacks: replay and parallel session. The total number of nodes that have been tested was 2,636 in 3.81 seconds. Figure 4 shows the results of the simulation.
From the result, we can conclude that the proposed protocol is secure under the test of AVISPA and it achieves the security goals.
Comparison
We compare our proposal with Li-Lee's scheme in terms of security goals. Table 2 summarizes the security comparison.
The proposed scheme does not need a verification table. As it is explained in [3] and [8] , an attacker or intruder can modify or extract sensitive information from the database. For that reasons, Chan and Wu proposed a remote password authentication without verification table.
The proposed scheme keeps the user anonymity during the registration phase and login phase. As it is explained in [6] , an attacker or intruder can get access to the network in order to obtain the user's identity. By means of this action, the attacker or intruder can trace the user's activity and can make identity theft attack. For that reasons, Das, Saxena and Gulati introduced the concept of dynamic identity.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new remote user authentication scheme which removes all the security flaws found in Li-Lee's scheme described in Section 3. The proposed scheme can resist very well-known attacks and achieves all the security goals that a secure remote user authentication scheme should have. We evaluated the security of our proposal using HLPSL, AVISPA tool, and back-end OFMC. After the simulation, the result was safe. Teacher Improvement Program (PROMEP), under the project number PROMEP/103.5/12/4525. 
